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INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES IN THE HIRING PROCESS AND THE RISK OF NEW LEADER 
DISMISSAL: INSIGHTS FROM ENGLISH PREMIER LEAGUE SOCCER ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Why are some new leaders dismissed quicker than others? Adopting agency theory logic we 
examine how different succession contexts shape boards’ information asymmetries about a 
potential candidate’s competencies in the hiring process, which influences the propensity of 
making poor hiring decisions and hence the risk of new leader dismissal. Employing duration 
analysis on a sample of 164 newly appointed leaders in the English premier league (1996 –
2014), we find that the risk of new leader dismissal is: (i) greater when the predecessor leader’s 
exit was initiated by them rather than by the board; (ii) greater when following a longer 
tenured predecessor; and (iii) lower for outside successions as compared to inside successions. 
 
Keywords: New leader dismissal, leader succession, agency theory, asymmetric information 
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INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES IN THE HIRING PROCESS AND THE RISK OF NEW LEADER 
DISMISSAL: INSIGHTS FROM ENGLISH PREMIER LEAGUE SOCCER ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 
 
Top leader tenure presents a paradox. On the one hand, leaders require time to become 
effective in their role, via scanning and learning about their new organizations and their 
environments (Aguilar, 1967; Rowe, Cannella, Rankin, & Gorman, 2005), and for their decisions 
to translate through into performance improvements (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; 
Graffin, Boivie, & Carpenter, 2013). On the other hand, pressure for instant success has meant 
that leaders are increasingly scrutinized and tend to be dismissed earlier in their tenures, which 
has led to average leader tenure falling dramatically in recent years (see: Favaro, Karlsson, & 
Neilson, 2010; Wiersema, 2002). To address the paradox, researchers have examined a range of 
theoretical explanations of new leader dismissal including: weak leader power (Shen & 
Cannella, 2002a), boards’ post-succession evaluation heuristics (Graffin et al., 2013), and 
information asymmetries faced by boards in the hiring process leading to adverse selection 
(Zhang, 2008). 
In this paper we focus on information asymmetries that boards face when hiring new 
leaders, which stem from boards’ informational deficits about leader candidates’ competencies 
as compared to the candidates themselves (Coff, 1997; Wiersema, 1992; Zajac, 1990).1 During 
the hiring process, boards seek to reduce information asymmetries about leader candidates’ 
competencies, to make the most effective appointment possible, as poor appointments entail 
                                                 
1 Our definition of a leader is someone who has been appointed into the position of leader (i.e., 
is formally defined by appointment). We accept, however, that a wider issue exists in relation 
to what a leader constitutes (see: Baruch, 1998). 
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costs and lost opportunities (Khurana, 2001). Asymmetric information, however, is an 
unobservable construct, which is a problem that permeates many key theories of strategic 
management including: resource-based theory, transaction cost economics, and agency theory 
(Godfrey & Hill, 1995). To address this issue, scholars of strategic management have a well-
established tradition of employing latent indicators to serve as observable proxies for 
unobservable variables (Godfrey & Hill, 1995). The use of latent indicators is also well-
established in the leader succession research, which has employed new leader origin (i.e., 
appointed from inside or outside of the organization) and the mode of predecessor leader exit 
(i.e., forced versus voluntary exit from a leader’s perspective) as observable proxies of 
asymmetric information in the hiring process (Zhang, 2008).  
Focusing on the period 1993–1998, Zhang (2008) found that asymmetric information in the 
hiring process and the likelihood of new leader dismissal were greater for outside as compared 
to inside appointments and for new leaders appointed following a forced leader exit (i.e., 
dismissal) as compared to a voluntary exit (i.e., mandatory retirements, migrating to another 
organization, ill-health). The received wisdom of these findings is that there is less asymmetric 
information with inside as compared to outside candidates, due to personal interactions and 
internal networks with inside candidates (Zhang, 2008). In addition, because dismissal is the 
most common form of unplanned leader exit, boards will face time pressure to appoint a new 
leader due to stakeholder pressures to resolve the issue (Wiersema, 2002). Consequently, 
boards are more likely approach the hiring process in haste, which hinders their ability to 
conduct effective due-diligence and reduce asymmetric information about a candidate’s 
competencies (Wiersema, 2002; Zhang, 2008).  
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Practice surrounding leader succession, however, has changed over time (Khurana, 2001; 
Zhang, 2011). Average leader tenure has fallen dramatically (via new leader dismissal) over the 
past 10–15 years (Zhang, 2008), driven by scrutiny and performance pressures (Wiersema, 
2002). The scrutiny of leaders has increased through the rise of media (and analyst) coverage, 
which has led to greater reporting of their actions and the rise of celebrity status (Malmendier 
& Tate, 2009). Such media attention changes the informational dynamics that shape succession 
decisions for internal and external leader candidates (Malmendier & Tate, 2009; Stern & James, 
2016). In addition, falling average leader tenure has created a labour market of experienced 
leaders (Zhang, 2011), with a concomitant increase in the proportion of leaders appointed from 
outside of the organization (Favaro, Karlsson, & Neilson, 2015, 2013)2 with prior leader 
experience (Bragaw & Misangyi, 2016; Hamori & Koyuncu, 2015; Karlsson & Neilson, 2009; 
Zhang, 2011).3 Furthermore, top leader migration, defined as an individual that directly moves 
from a top leader position at one organization to a top leader position of another organization, 
has also increased over time (see: Hamori & Koyuncu, 2015; Lucier, Kocourek, & Habbel, 2006). 
Accordingly, the traditional hiring practice of appointing leaders from within, who remain in 
post until a planned succession via mandatory retirement (see: Kesner & Sebora, 1994; 
Khurana, 2001), is increasingly being challenged (Zhang, 2011). 
Given the  changes noted above we feel that it is now time to re-examine received wisdom 
about information asymmetries and how they shape succession decision-making (Zajac, 1990; 
                                                 
2 For example, 30 percent of new CEO leaders were outsiders in 2012, a 45 percent increase on the 
average level of the previous three years in the world’s largest 2500 business organizations (Favaro et 
al., 2013).   
3 While the appointment of CEO leaders with prior leadership experience only comprised one percent up 
until the late-eighties, it comprised 20 percent of new appointments between 2007 and 2009 (Karlsson 
& Neilson, 2009). 
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Zhang, 2008). Specifically, in light of the changes noted above to the hiring process of new 
leaders, we advance the understanding about how asymmetric information shapes new leader 
dismissal by examining three important components of the hiring process that are subject to 
varying degrees of information asymmetries about a potential candidate’s competencies facing 
boards when hiring new leaders. 
First, we challenge the received wisdom that asymmetric information in the hiring process is 
most pronounced following a predecessor leader dismissal (Zhang, 2008). Specifically, extant 
literature views predecessor leader exits as being forced (i.e., dismissal) or voluntary 
(mandatory retirements, migration to another organization, ill-health), viewing dismissal as the 
most unplanned exit (Wiersema, 2002; Zhang, 2008). Given that early leader tenure dismissal 
has posed a challenge to internal development programs via a reduction in mandatory 
retirements, and the increased incidence of leader migration (Zhang, 2011), leader exits are 
becoming more unplanned from a board’s perspective. Accordingly, we focus on the difference 
between planned (i.e., mandatory retirement) and unplanned leader exits (i.e., dismissal, 
migration to another leader role, ill-health) from the perspective of the board (Friedman & Saul, 
1991). As within the category of unplanned leader exits there will exist differences to which the 
exit is unplanned, we conceptualize unplanned predecessor leader exits as being either leader-
initiated (i.e., leader migration, ill-health) or board-initiated (i.e., leader dismissal) from a 
board’s perspective (Friedman & Saul, 1991). We expect leader-initiated exits to have a greater 
unplanned dimension, and hence subject to greater asymmetric information in the subsequent 
hiring process, than board-initiated exists because boards will be less prepared for a leadership 
change (Friedman & Saul, 1991). 
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Second, we focus on leader stability by examining the impact of predecessor leader tenure 
on new leader dismissal, an issue that has not been explored in the extant literature. We argue 
that the increasing incidence of new leader dismissal and leader migration creates problems for 
leadership stability, which will shape the asymmetric information in the subsequent hiring 
process (Karaevli & Zajac, 2013). Drawing on the strategic leadership and governance literature 
about the influence of leader tenure (Graffin, Carpenter, & Boivie, 2011; Karaevli & Zajac, 2013; 
Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Ryan, Wang, Wiggins, 2009), we suggest that the level of predecessor 
leader tenure importantly affects boards’ ability to reduce asymmetric information about a 
potential candidate’s competencies as it will shape boards’ recent experience in conducting 
leader succession at the focal organization. Accordingly, new attention to the stability of 
leadership can help to advance the understanding about how asymmetric information 
influences new leader dismissal. 
Third, we challenge received wisdom that information asymmetries are greater for 
externally, as opposed to internally, appointed leaders (Zajac, 1990; Zhang, 2008). We argue 
that the leader role is significantly different from a supporting role, such that the information 
gathered about an internal candidate does not accurately reflect their ability to undertake the 
leader role. We suggest that the increased availability of (top leader) experienced external 
candidates (Zhang, 2011), and greater availability of information about external leaders’ 
effectiveness through the media, will reduce information asymmetries about external leaders 
and hence the risk of new leader dismissal.  
We test our ideas using data on leaders (i.e., head coaches) in the English premier league 
(EPL) from 1996 to 2014. We do so because the EPL context is one in which many of the 
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emerging trends of leader succession in larger public organizations, the focus of extant research 
to date (Graffin et al., 2013; Zhang, 2008), are already well established. In the EPL, leader exits 
are typically unplanned whilst the general norm is to appoint leaders from outside of the 
organization (Sonnenfeld & Peiperl, 1988), many of which have prior leadership experience. 
Finally, the competitive process is highly transparent due to voluminous media coverage of and 
detailed commentary on leaders’ actions (Brady, Bolchover, & Sturgess, 2008). 
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND NEW LEADER DISMISSAL  
Asymmetric information is an important determinant of new leader dismissal because 
information asymmetries will always exist in the hiring process (Zajac, 1990; Zhang, 2008). 
When hiring new leaders, boards face the problem that potential leader candidates have more 
information about themselves than the board, and so candidates may have the opportunity to 
misrepresent their competencies, leading to less than optimal appointments (i.e., the problem 
of adverse selection) (Coff, 1997; Wiersema, 1992; Zajac, 1990; Zhang, 2008). Failed successions 
are problematic as they entail costs for organizations, such as those associated with the leader 
search and the transitionary period (Mooney, Semadeni, & Kesner, 2014). A key role for boards 
in the hiring process is to engage in due diligence, to minimize information asymmetries about 
a candidate’s suitability for the position (e.g., see Wolf, 2015), with the aim of enhancing the 
effectiveness of their appointments (Khurana, 2001). The hiring process, however, is a complex 
task, and one that is infrequent in nature making learning across successions problematic 
(Graffin et al., 2011; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Lorsch & Khurana, 1999). Furthermore, while prior 
experiences and reputation may inform boards about a potential candidate’s competencies, 
there is no guarantee that the individual will be successful in the new role (Khurana, 2002; 
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Zhang, 2008). Indeed, a new leader’s experience may be firm-specific, making it difficult to 
evaluate its transferability during the hiring process (Zhang, 2008). Additionally, inside 
candidates, even if better known, are liable to adverse selection because the leadership 
position entails an understanding and pressure that cannot be experienced in other positions 
(Charan, 2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994).  
Post hiring (i.e., early leader tenure) boards will be better able to ascertain the quality of 
their hiring decisions, where they can observe the new leaders more closely and acquire further 
information about their suitability for the role (Holmstrom, 1999). In the event of a poor hiring 
decision, boards will typically dismiss the new leader (Walsh & Seward, 1990; Zhang, 2008). 
Hence, the greater the problem of asymmetric information in the hiring process the greater the 
risk of making poor hiring decisions (i.e., adverse selection), and new leader dismissal (Zhang, 
2008). 
Building on extant research (see: Graffin et al., 2013; Wiersema, 2002; Zhang, 2008) we 
focus on three components of the hiring process that influence the degree to which the 
succession decision to hire a new leader will be subject to the problem of asymmetric 
information leading to adverse selection and new leader dismissal: (i) the mode of the 
predecessor leader’s exit; (ii) predecessor leader tenure; and (iii) the origin of the new leader.  
The mode of predecessor leader exit 
From a board’s perspective a leader exit can either be planned or unplanned (Friedman & 
Saul, 1991). A planned leader exit is typically defined in terms of a leader relinquishing the role 
due to mandatory retirement (Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004), with an 
unplanned leader exit defined in terms of leader dismissal, leader migration to another 
9 
 
organization, or stepping down due to ill-health (Friedman & Saul, 1991). The received wisdom 
is that unplanned leader exits, as compared to planned leader exits, make the process of 
appointing a new leader more problematic due to their unexpected nature. Specifically, 
unplanned leader exits will shape the extent to which the subsequent leadership search is 
undertaken in haste due to pressures from important stakeholders demanding their 
organizations have a leader (Wiersema, 2002), which can stifle boards’ ability to reduce 
information asymmetries via effective due diligence in the hiring process (Zhang, 2008). 
Planned exits have fallen dramatically in recent years (Zhang, 2011), with a concomitant 
increase in unplanned exists (Favaro et al., 2010; Hamori & Koyuncu, 2015; Karlsson & Neilson, 
2009). Within the category of unplanned leader exists, however, there is considerable 
heterogeneity as to the degree to which the exit is unplanned, which stems from whether or 
not the unplanned exit is leader-initiated or board-initiated. From the boards’ perspective, 
leader-initiated exits (i.e., leader migration, ill-health) are more likely to be unplanned than 
board-initiated exits as boards have not planned for a change (i.e., leader dismissal) (Friedman 
& Saul, 1991). Although unplanned, a board-initiated leader exit occurs when the board feels 
that there is a need to replace a leader. In such instances, boards will likely have incorporated 
some evaluation of existing organizational issues, and considered what the requirements of the 
new leader will be. Indeed, it is common for performance to be evaluated closely in the run-up 
to a dismissal decision, where boards have more active dialogue about the leader and potential 
succession planning (Shen & Cannella, 2002b; Wiersema, 2002). In contrast, leader-initiated 
exits occur when the board does not intend to make changes, the change of leader being forced 
on the organization (Friedman & Saul, 1991). Accordingly, boards will be less prepared to 
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engage in the hiring process, including analyzing the internal conditions of the organization, in 
re-evaluating goals, and hence setting the objectives of the organization so as to identify 
appropriate candidates, which will become more time pressured as a consequence (Khurana, 
2001). 
We suggest, therefore, that boards will face greater information asymmetries in the hiring 
process following a predecessor leader exit that was leader-initiated as compared to one that 
was board-initiated, which will increase the risk of adverse selection in the hiring decision and 
hence new leader dismissal. Hence: 
 
H1: Newly appointed leaders will face a greater risk of dismissal in the event of a 
predecessor’s exit that was leader-initiated (i.e. migration or ill-health) as compared 
to one that was board-initiated (i.e. dismissal). 
 
 
 Predecessor leader tenure 
 
 The level of leadership stability will shape the asymmetric information facing boards about a 
candidate’s competencies in the hiring process, via the frequency of enacting the succession 
process (Graffin et al., 2011; Lorsch & Khurana, 1999; Shen, 2003). Predecessor leader tenure is 
an important indicator of leadership stability, reflecting the frequency of leader successions in 
an organization’s recent history (Karaevli & Zajac, 2013; Shen & Cannella, 2002b).  
In stable organizations the succession decision is an infrequent task, but one of vital 
importance (Lorsch & Khurana, 1999). If an organization is characterized by longer predecessor 
leader tenure it means that the time since the last succession process was employed will be 
greater, and that the board will not have recent experience of making hiring decisions in the 
context of the focal organization (Graffin et al., 2011; Wiersema, 2002). Hence, the lack of 
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recent hiring will hinders boards’ ability to apply learning across leader successions (Graffin et 
al., 2011), which makes the hiring process increasingly prone to uncertainty. Therefore, boards’ 
ability to reduce asymmetric information about a potential candidate’s competencies in the 
subsequent hiring process, via effective due-diligence, will be reduced. Furthermore, research 
suggests that as leader tenure increases, an indication that leaders have proven their leadership 
credentials, boards increase their confidence in the leader and become relaxed and less diligent 
in monitoring the leader and organization (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Ryan et al., 2009; Shen, 
2003). Accordingly, the prevalence and/or effectiveness of succession planning may be reduced 
when successions occur after longer predecessor leader tenure, which will exacerbate the 
inherent problem of asymmetric information. 
In contrast, shorter predecessor leader tenure (or leadership instability) indicates 
weaknesses on behalf of the board as it reflects a failure to make the appointment work either 
because boards have made poor appointments, not supported the leader, or not done enough 
to retain their services (Karaevli & Zajac, 2013). Leadership instability can lead to increased 
costs, lost opportunities, and unfavorable perceptions and reductions in morale from internal 
and external actors (Shen & Cannella 2002b; Khurana, 2001). Boards, therefore, have a strong 
incentive to avoid any further leadership (and organizational) disruptions by being more 
diligent in terms of reducing the information asymmetries they face in subsequent hiring 
processes. Indeed, boards will increase their efforts in matters of corporate governance after an 
unsuccessful leadership experience (Karaevli & Zajac, 2013). Furthermore, where predecessor 
leader tenure has been short, boards will have the opportunity to apply learning from recent 
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hiring processes to help reduce information asymmetries in the subsequent hiring process and 
improve succession decision-making accordingly (Graffin et al., 2011). Hence: 
 
H2: Newly appointed leaders that follow a longer-tenured predecessor leader will 
face a greater risk of dismissal. 
 
 
New leader origin 
 
Leader origin relates to whether the leader is appointed from inside or outside of the 
organization (Kesner & Sebora, 1994). Extant research suggests that boards will face greater 
information asymmetries about outside candidates’ competencies in the hiring process, which 
will increase the risk of new leader dismissal (Zhang, 2008). In contrast, asymmetric information 
will be less severe when appointing insiders, the logic being boards have greater access to 
information about their competencies through personal interactions and/or internal networks 
(Shen & Cannella, 2002a; Zajac, 1990). 
As noted in the introduction, the changing nature of leader succession practices at large 
business organizations has led to a greater proportion of new leaders being appointed from 
outside of the organization, many of which have prior leader experience (Hamori & Koyuncu, 
2015; Karlsson & Neilson, 2009; Zhang, 2011). We suggest such changes will influence the 
asymmetric information facing boards about a candidate’s competencies in hiring process. The 
availability of more (top leader) experienced outsiders, allied to a greater availability of 
information about them through increased media attention (Deephouse, 2000; Graffin & Ward, 
2010; Khurana, 2002; Murphy & Zábojnik, 2007, 2004), means that the information 
asymmetries facing boards in hiring outsiders will be reduced. For instance, the prominence of 
celebrity leaders in the media is providing boards with more information about the 
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performance and actions of leaders (Bednar, 2012; Hamilton & Zeckhauser, 2002; Khurana, 
2002). The media increasingly serves as a governance mechanism, whereby leaders strategic 
decisions and actions are meticulously monitored and (ruthlessly) critiqued, generating 
significant information and analysis about leaders’ competencies that boards can use in the 
hiring process (Ketchen, Adams, & Shook, 2008; Khurana, 2002; Park & Berger, 2004). We 
suggest that there will be greater (recent) information about outside candidates’ competencies 
because of the visibility of the leadership role and the media attention leaders garner. 
In contrast, while inside candidates may, to some extent, be known to the board via being 
tested in various non-leadership roles, boards will face higher levels of information 
asymmetries in appointing the inside candidate due to their lack/limited (recent) leadership 
experience (Charan, 2005). Furthermore, inside candidates who are currently in a non-leader 
role will receive much less media attention, and so there will be less (recent) information about 
their competencies to perform in the top job. Indeed, research suggests that those in the 
number two position are tasked with different responsibilities (e.g., day-to-day management 
role) than those exhibited in the number one position (e.g., setting the long-term direction of 
the organization, accountability to stakeholders), and contributions that are less visible (Heenan 
& Bennis, 1999; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Miles & Bennet, 2006). As the growing prevalence of 
candidates with leadership experience will increase the parameters used by boards when 
making hiring decisions, the fact that the leadership position is different to any other will now 
be particularly pronounced for inside candidates (Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Khurana, 2001).   
In summary, boards face greater information asymmetries when hiring inside candidates, as 
compared to outside candidates, due to increases in information about outside leaders’ 
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competencies and concerns about inside candidates’ ability to step up to the role of leader. 
Hence: 
 
H3: Newly appointed leaders will face a lower risk of dismissal if they are appointed 
from outside of the organization as compared to inside of the organization. 
 
 
METHOD AND DATA 
Empirical setting 
 
We test our ideas using data of leaders in the EPL, which as a professional sports team 
industry is a context that is well established for examining leadership and succession 
phenomena (Giambatista, Rowe, & Riaz, 2005). As noted in the introduction, our choice of 
empirical setting is motivated by the changes in the hiring practices of top leaders in the 
context of large public organizations being already well established in the EPL context. As a 
result, the EPL context provides a quasi-natural laboratory to explore our ideas (Wolfe et al., 
2005). Furthermore, sports team data can provide better “opportunities to observe, accurately 
measure, and compare variables of interest over time” (Wolfe et al., 2005: 185). From a board’s 
perspective, the appointment of leaders in the EPL and business organizations are critical 
decisions as both: are accountable for financial performance (as team performance has a strong 
effect on financial performance in sports based settings) (Lewis, 2005); involve leading teams of 
individuals; need to satisfy important stakeholder groups (Desai, Lockett, & Paton, 2016; 
Ndofor, Priem, Rathburn, & Dhir, 2009; Rowe et al., 2005). 
Sample and data 
 
Our sample is based on 164 leaders that competed in the EPL from 1996 to 2014. We use 
game-level data from the EPL competition so that we can better observe variations within a 
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season, which would not be possible using season-level data. Consistent with prior research, 
our sample contains only league games for leaders and not those relating to cup competitions 
because not all organizations have access to such competitions, which can create 
inconsistencies across organizations and leaders in our sample (Hughes, Hughes, Mellahi, & 
Guermat, 2010). In addition, we do not track interim leaders that did not become permanent 
appointments as they may affect our model by providing more weight to non-dismissals. We 
do, however, control for the effect of interim leaders as it may shape the new leader’s tenure 
outcomes. In total, our sample provides us with a total of 6,613 leader–game observations. 
Consistent with prior succession and dismissal research (e.g., Graffin et al., 2013; Zhang, 
2008), we employ an early post-succession time window to explore the risk of new leader 
dismissal. While studies using large business organizations have tended to use a two (Graffin et 
al., 2013) or three (Zhang, 2008) year early post-succession window with the year of entry being 
year zero and included in the analyses, we employ a one year (i.e., season) window. We do so 
because performance and actions at sports organizations are typically evaluated on a weekly 
basis, as compared to longer periods in (large) business organizations, meaning that boards are 
quicker at evaluating leaders. Further, we use seasons as our guidance to effectively track new 
leaders’ early tenure games in post, as compared to an arbitrary time period (e.g., leaders’ first 
50 games), because it will allow for consistency across soccer organizations and leaders in 
terms of the evaluations and attributions leaders face during a typical season (e.g., the ‘run-in’, 
which refers to the final 10 or so games in a season) and whereby boards may be more likely to 
dismiss leaders at certain points in time accordingly (e.g., end of a season). As a robustness test, 
we ran our models using early tenure windows of the first 40, 50, 60, and 70 games. The results 
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did not significantly change. In summary, all leaders are tracked for the number of games in 
their season of entry (season =0) plus the number of games in the subsequent season 
(season=1), subject to exit. 
Estimation procedure 
 
To examine the risk of new leader dismissal we employed duration analysis (using Stata). 
Duration analysis views leaders as being under threat of dismissal (hazard) on appointment and 
they are seen to fail if they experience the dismissal event; those leaders that do not 
experience dismissal are censored. Employing duration analysis we are able to take into 
consideration the impact of time (i.e., leader tenure as measured by the number of games in 
post) in the estimation (Shen and Cannella, 2002a). Accordingly, our dependent variable is 
defined as the time to new leader dismissal. The dismissal event refers to when leaders leave 
their posts for reasons other than mandatory retirement, health reasons, or taking up a post in 
another organization (Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988; Zhang, 2008, 2006). Using press 
releases via LexisNexis we categorized leader dismissal as exits that were reported for reasons 
of being “sacked”, “dismissed”, or “mutual consent”, and which referred to situations 
associated with policy differences and tensions with the board, and/or poor performance (Fee 
& Hadlock, 2004).  In our sample of 164 newly appointed leaders, 67 (41 percent) were 
dismissed (i.e., board-initiated exit), the remaining 97 (59 percent) either: (i) migrated to 
another organization; (ii) were relegated and hence dropped out of the sample; or (iii) 
remained in post at the end of the sample period. 
We modeled our duration data using the Cox (1972) proportional hazard model, the benefits 
of which are that it does not assert any assumptions regarding the shape of the baseline hazard 
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and it allows for the impact of the estimated covariates. The Cox model is appropriate for our 
study because we have little prior knowledge to be able to assert any functional form to the 
underlying baseline hazard function. Being a semi-parametric approach, the Cox model is one in 
which time is not parameterized, but the effects of covariates are (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & May, 
2011). All leaders face a hazard rate that is multiplicatively proportional to the baseline hazard, 
which is then adjusted by a vector of covariates. The equation for the Cox proportional hazard 
model can be given as follows: 
 
Where  is the baseline hazard rate and  is the exponential of the vector of covariates 
[exp ( X)], which scales the baseline hazard up or down. The Cox model implements binary-
outcome analyses at each of the individual failure times, which provides the probability for 
those that failed at that time (Hosmer et al., 2011). 
Model variables 
 
Our data set is unique and gathered from a range of archival sources. Table 1 presents our 
variables, measures, and associated data sources. 
 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
Leader-initiated predecessor exit was measured as a binary variable that was coded one if 
the predecessor leader exited for reasons such as migrating to a leadership position elsewhere 
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and ill-health. We identified 38 (23 percent) leaders that were appointed after a leader-initiated 
exit. 
Predecessor leader tenure was measured as the total number of league games the 
predecessor was in post. As the number of games in a season in the EPL varied prior to the 
1995/96 season, and as did the number of games of predecessors that competed in the 
Championship league in the case of promoted organizations (see promoted organizations 
variable below), we scaled all seasons to the equivalent of a 38 game season for consistency.  
Outside Succession was measured as a binary variable taking the value of one if the leader 
was hired from outside of the organization. We identified 128 (78 percent) outside successions. 
Control variables 
 
Concurrent performance was measured as the league position after the focal game 
(observation). A league position of one means top of the league and 20 is bottom (i.e., the 
lower the relative performance). We take the reverse (i.e., 21 minus league position) so that 
higher values equate to better relative performance.  
Concurrent prior performance is a lagged measure of performance and was constructed by 
taking the average of total points a leader attained in the prior three games to the focal game 
(win=three points, tie= one point, and loss=zero points). Research shows that recent 
performance is the most important in determining leader dismissal in a soccer team context 
(Audas, Dobson, & Goddard, 1999). As a robustness test, we took the prior five game average 
total performance and the results did not change. 
Promoted organization was measured as a binary variable taking the value of one when a 
soccer organization is promoted to the EPL from the Championship league. The EPL is 
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structured in a way such that the three teams that are bottom of the league at the end of each 
season are demoted to the Championship league (CHL), the league below the EPL. In turn, three 
teams are promoted from the CHL to the EPL. 
Within-season succession refers to when a leader is appointed during a competitive season. 
We measure this as a binary variable taking the value of one if the succession was during an 
active season. We identified 101 (62%) such appointments. 
Foreign ownership is a binary variable, which takes the value of one for the period of time a 
soccer organization is owned by investors from outside of the United Kingdom. We identified 
33 (20 percent) leaders that worked under foreign ownership in our sample.. 
Annual wage bill was measured as the total wage cost in a given season divided by the 
average wage cost across all 20 soccer organization in that season to account for inflation 
effects. It is acknowledged that team member salaries make up a major proportion of a soccer 
organization’s wage cost and has typically been viewed as a reflection of team quality (Brady et 
al., 2008; Fee, Hadlock, & Pierce, 2006; Gerrard, 2006). 
Leader was a prior player reflects the possibility that the leader has an affiliation with the 
soccer organization, which may shape new leader tenure. We measured this as a binary 
variable taking the value of one if the leader was a past player at the organization. We 
identified 34 (21 percent) leaders that were players at the hiring organization. 
Prior interim-leader tenure refers to whether or not, and how long, there was an interim 
leader (also referred to as ‘caretaker manager’ in the EPL) in position prior to the appointment 
of a new leader. An interim-leader is typically appointed as a temporary placeholder while the 
board searches for a permanent replacement, which may be important because it influences 
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the hiring process (Ballinger & Marcel, 2010; Khurana, 2001; Marcel, Cowen, & Ballinger, 2013). 
We measured this as a continuous variable in terms of the total number of games an interim 
leader was at the helm prior to new leader appointment. 
Split-leadership structure was measured as a binary variable taking the value of one if a 
director of football is present, and zero otherwise. A director of football in the EPL is 
synonymous to the general manager role in US based sports organizations. We suggest that the 
director of football role is similar to the role of chief operating officers at (large) business 
organizations, and include it as it may shape new leader dismissal (Cannella & Shen, 2001; 
Zhang, 2006). In our sample, we identified 37 (23 percent) leaders that operated under a split-
leadership structure. 
Returning leader was measured as a binary variable taking the value of one if the new leader 
had been leader of the focal organization in the past.. 
Prior leadership experience was captured as a continuous variable and relates to the total 
number of seasons of top leader experience before the focal appointment. In our sample, 138 
(84 percent) of leaders had prior leadership experience. 
Leader Reputation was measured as the total number of competitions/awards won as a 
leader at elite soccer organizations prior to appointment. By elite organization we mean any 
soccer organization that is placed in the top five leagues in Europe (England [EPL], Spain, 
France, Italy, and Germany), or led an organization in any league while competing in the UEFA 
champions league (the most prestigious intra-European competition). In terms of awards, we 
accounted for league championships, domestic cup competitions, and European cup 
competitions as they will be the most visible to institutional actors. Leader reputation may 
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signal the individual’s ability, which is different from experience (Cannella and Rowe, 1995), and 
may affect the dismissal decision (Finkelstein, 1992). 
Strategic changes were measured as the total number of player acquisitions divided by the 
leader’s tenure in a given season. We constructed the variable on a season-specific basis 
because leaders typically have two windows in a given year in which to invest in team 
members, with the vast majority of business being conducted in the close season. 
We control for the possibility that dismissal may be time-dependent (Zhang, 2008), and so 
created the variable first season dummy that takes the value of one in the season after the 
season a leader was appointed. Coefficient values signify the comparison of leaders’ first 
season in office to their year of entry. Finally, we created dummy variables for the seasons 
1996–2014, using 1996 as the base year, to control for any season-specific effects. 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations for our independent variables are presented in 
table 2. Model 1 in table 3 reports the duration analyses for our control variables only, and 
models 2– 6 report the results of the duration analyses for our hypotheses predicting the risk of 
new leader dismissal. In interpreting the analyses it is important to note that a positive 
coefficient sign signifies an increase in the hazard of new leader dismissal (i.e., speeds up the 
time to new leader dismissal), and a negative coefficient signifies a decrease in the hazard of 
new leader dismissal (i.e., slows down the time to new leader dismissal). 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
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The results pertaining to our hypotheses are as follows. Hypothesis 1 predicts that newly 
appointed leaders will face a greater risk of dismissal after a predecessor leader exit that was 
leader-initiated, as compared to one that was board-initiated. Our results show a coefficient 
that is both positive and significant (b=1.224, p < 0.01 in model 2; b=1.003, p <0.05 in model 4; 
b=0.875, p <0.10 in model 6). Using model 6, the substantive significance of these results 
suggests new leaders that have not yet succumbed to dismissal are around twice more likely to 
be dismissed in the next game if the predecessor leader exit was initiated by the predecessor 
leader than the board [exp (0.875)]. Hence, there is evidence to support H1. 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
Hypothesis 2 suggests that new leaders that are appointed after a longer-tenured leader will 
face a greater risk of dismissal. Our results show a coefficient that is positive and significant (b= 
0.005, p < 0.001 in model 3; b= 0.004, p < 0.001 in models 4 and 6). Using model 6, the 
substantive significance of our result is that an increase in the tenure of the predecessor leader 
by twenty games is likely to increase the hazard of dismissal by around eight percent 
[exp(0.004*20)].  Hence, we provide evidence to support H2. 
Hypothesis 3 suggests that the risk of dismissal is likely to be lower for newly appointed 
outside leaders than newly appointed inside leaders. Our results show a coefficient that is 
negative and significant (b = –1.766, p < 0.001 in model 5; b = –1.647, p <0.01 in model 6). Using 
model 6, the substantive significance of these results suggests that new outside leaders reduce 
the hazard by 80 percent as compared to new inside leaders [exp(–1.647)–1].  Hence, there is 
evidence to support H3. 
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DISCUSSION 
In this paper we have built on and extended the work of Zhang (2008) by revisiting the 
relationship between asymmetric information in the hiring process and new leader dismissal 
due to changes in labour markets and hiring practices. Leaders are now under more scrutiny 
than ever (Favaro et al., 2010; Hamori & Koyuncu, 2015), resulting in falling average leader 
tenure meaning that; there are more and more leaders who are experienced and available 
outside of the organization (Zhang, 2011); and media and analyst coverage has never been 
greater with a greater reporting of leaders’ actions and the rise of their celebrity status 
(Malmendier & Tate, 2009). With respect to these emerging trends, we follow Zhang’s (2008) 
lead and develop upon important components of the hiring process that are characterized by 
varying levels of asymmetric information that boards face about leader candidates’ 
competencies in the hiring process. Below we outline and discuss the main contributions of our 
study.  
The mode of predecessor leader exit 
  
We found that new leaders are at a greater risk of dismissal when the predecessor leader’s 
exit was leader-initiated rather than board-initiated. While both are an unplanned mode of exit 
from a board’s perspective (Friedman & Saul, 1991), leader-initiated and board-initiated exits 
differ by the extent they are unplanned, which in turn have differing influences on boards’ 
ability to mitigate asymmetric information in the hiring process. Our findings challenge the 
received wisdom that views dismissal as the most unexpected mode of leader exit, one that 
enhances the asymmetric information in the hiring of the next leader as compared to voluntary 
exits (e.g., Graffin et al., 2013; Zhang, 2008). Accordingly, our findings question the extent to 
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which a board-initiated exit is unplanned. Leader dismissals for poor performance or a fall-out 
with the board, the common forms of dismissal exits (Fee & Hadlock, 2004; Lucier, Schuyt, & 
Handa, 2004), are typically preceded by a period of evaluation of the leader’s performance and 
the potential succession plan, which clearly have a planned dimension (Shen & Cannella, 2002a; 
Wiersema, 2002). In contrast, a board will not have planned for a leader-initiated exit, which 
will force the board into an unplanned hiring process (Friedman & Saul, 1991). Furthermore, 
this implies that the unplanned nature of board-initiated exits will likely be much greater when 
boards are enacting dismissal for reasons such as misconduct (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011; 
Pozner, 2007). 
Our findings suggest a need to revisit the way we view the role of predecessor leader exits as 
shaping asymmetric information in the hiring process. Existing work typically categorizes 
predecessor leader exit as being either forced (i.e., dismissal) or voluntary from a leader’s 
perspective (Graffin et al., 2013; Zhang, 2008), the voluntary exit encompassing departures due 
to being poached, ill-health, and mandatory retirements. The category of voluntary exits, 
however, includes unplanned leadership exits through being poached (migration) and ill-health 
(Friedman & Saul, 1991). Our theorization and empirical findings question the traditional 
categorization of predecessor leader exit as it fails to take into consideration important 
differences that may exist in the degree to which a leader exit is unplanned, and hence the 
extent to which the subsequent hiring process will be subject to asymmetric information. We 
suggest that focusing on the extent to which a leader exit is unplanned from the perspective of 
the board will contribute to a better understanding of how asymmetric information shapes new 
leader dismissal. 
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Predecessor leader tenure 
 
We found that longer predecessor leader tenure (i.e., leadership stability) increases the risk 
of new leader dismissal. We suggest our finding underscores an important factor that 
influences the asymmetric information about candidates’ competencies in hiring process via 
boards’ preparedness for the hiring process (Khurana, 2002; Zhang, 2008). Building on the 
practical reality that the hiring process is a complex task and one that is infrequent in nature, 
we proposed that longer (predecessor) leader tenure will result in boards lacking the 
experience of enacting the hiring process at the focal organization (Graffin et al., 2011), which 
makes the hiring process increasingly prone to uncertainty and hence asymmetric information. 
The problem being exacerbated due to boards’ propensity to lower their level of corporate 
governance as leader tenure increases (Lorsch & Khurana, 1999; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Ryan 
et al., 2009). Shorter leader tenure, in contrast, may actually motivate boards to re-double their 
efforts via greater diligence in the hiring process, and provide opportunities to apply learning 
across successions (Graffin et al., 2011; Zajac & Karaevli, 2013).  
Our findings highlight the paradoxical nature of leader tenure. While scholars have long 
argued the issues and costs of leadership instability (Khurana, 2001), our findings also point to 
potential issues of too much leadership stability and poses questions about the optimal level of 
leader tenure. Clearly, longer leader tenure not only has negative implications at the 
leadership-level via ineffective decision making (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991), but also at the 
board-level where understanding of the of the organization and monitoring of leaders 
decreases, due to having greater confidence in the leader (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Ryan et al., 
2009; Shen, 2003), making subsequent successions increasingly liable to asymmetric 
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information and adverse selection (Wiersema, 2002). By demonstrating that the time to 
dismissal is quicker for the newly appointed leader, our findings highlight and reinforce the idea 
that the succession of longer-tenured predecessors can present difficulties to subsequent 
organizational outcomes (see: Friedman & Saul, 1991; Graffin et al., 2011; Shen & Cannella, 
2002b). 
New leader origin 
 
Our evidence suggests that newly appointed outside leaders experience a lower risk of 
dismissal than inside leaders. The finding challenges the received wisdom that boards will face 
lower levels of asymmetric information and adverse selection for inside leaders because they 
will be better known to the board via greater interactions and internal networks (Shen & 
Cannella, 2002a; Zhang, 2008). We accept that boards will possess greater information about 
inside candidates (Zajac, 1990; Wiersema, 2002; Zhang, 2008), but question how relevant their 
information is in relation to their ability to undertake the role of leader. Falling average leader 
tenures has led to the creation of a labour market for experienced leaders (Zhang, 2011), who 
have a leadership track record that boards can assess in the hiring process.  This process is 
being increasingly aided by enhanced media coverage of the leadership position (Malmendier & 
Tate, 2009; Stern & James, 2016). Hence, we suggest that in such settings boards will face 
greater asymmetric information about inside as compared to outside leader candidates’ 
competencies as leader in the hiring process. Accordingly, our findings enable us to specify 
important boundary conditions influencing the risk of newly appointed leaders from inside and 
outside the organization.  
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We must note that appointing candidates that have prior leadership experience does not 
necessarily equate to better hiring decisions (Khurana, 2001; Zhang, 2008). Indeed, our study 
did not show a significant linkage between the level of prior leadership experience and a 
reduced risk of new leader dismissal, and only a weak relationship between leader reputation 
and a lower risk of new leader dismissal. Clearly, leaders’ experience and track record are no 
guarantee that they will be successful in the new role (Shen, 2003; Zhang, 2008). Rather, we 
suggest that because there will be a readily available external supply flow of outside candidates 
who are more likely to have prior leadership experience (Sonnenfeld & Peiperl, 1988; Zhang, 
2011), there will be more information about their competencies in the top job for boards to 
assess than inside candidates. This may imply that inside candidates will need to prove their 
potential to step up to the top job more than ever as such labour market trends become more 
prominent. 
Limitations and future research 
While our empirical context is particularly useful for furthering our understanding of new 
leader dismissal, it is important to acknowledge the potential limits to the generalizability of 
our results and look to interesting directions for future research.  
First, while we discussed planned exits from a conceptual point of view, we note that 
mandatory retirement is not a common phenomenon in the EPL, with only one event in our 
sample period close to following a planned leader exit.4 Furthermore, leaders in the EPL are 
typically dismissed for reasons of poor strategic decisions and/or poor performance, and rarely 
                                                 
4 This pertains to Sir Alex Ferguson, the leader of Manchester United (1986–2013) who retired 
voluntarily than mandatory, was succeeded by David Moyes. As a robustness test, we omitted 
the observations pertaining to David Moyes from our sample and our results did not change.  
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for illegal practices. While our empirical context was important as it enabled us to examine the 
differing effects of unplanned leader exits, future research in business organization contexts 
should formally examine planned (mandatory retirements) versus unplanned (board-initiated 
versus leader-initiated) predecessor leader exits to better understand its linkage with new 
leader dismissal. Coupled with this, future research should decompose leader dismissal (i.e., 
board-initiated exits) via their degree of unplannedness (e.g., poor performance versus 
illegal/unethical actions) to explore if they have differing effects on new leader dismissal. 
 Second, our study developed important argumentation based on boards’ propensity to 
learn across successions via shorter leader tenures and the increasing role of the media in 
analyzing business and leadership (Graffin et al., 2011; Malmendier & Tate, 2009). Given the 
importance of leadership succession on organizational outcomes (Kesner & Sebora, 1994), 
future research should explore the role of both factors in the hiring and dismissal decision. 
Furthermore, findings of the study demonstrated a high risk of new leader dismissal for both 
returning leaders and leaders at teams with high wage bills—i.e., a perception of high team 
quality (Fee et al., 2006). Clearly, expectations will play a significant role in new leader 
dismissal, which illuminates an interesting area of future research. 
Finally, EPL leaders are evaluated on a game-by-game basis, which is commonly every week 
(or even more frequently in some cases) throughout a season (operating year), whereas most 
business organizations’ performance is measured over a longer time window. Accordingly, we 
urge scholars and practitioners to interpret the findings with a degree of caution with respect 
to timing differences.  
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Notwithstanding the discussion above, we contend that the EPL context offers an interesting 
window into the future of succession decisions at (large) business organizations, and hence 
provide boards with greater knowledge when making hiring and dismissal decisions (see 
below). Furthermore, our context can offer new theoretical insights for leadership succession 
scholarship and we urge researchers to replicate and extend our ideas using different 
samples/contexts. 
Practical implications 
 
We suggest that there are three main practical implications that stem from our work. First, 
boards need to be aware that the level of uncertainty via the haste in which they approach the 
hiring process can differ depending on whether the predecessor leader was dismissed by them 
(i.e., board-initiated) or exited on their own accord to seek opportunities elsewhere or issues 
related to health (i.e., leader-initiated). Hence, succession planning becomes more and more 
important, particularly given the increase in unplanned leader exits (see: Wolf, 2015). Second, 
our finding that longer predecessor leader tenure increases the risk of new leader dismissal 
suggests that boards need to be alert to the fact that the tenure of the predecessor leader will 
influence the manner in which they approach the hiring process. Hiring top leaders is a complex 
process (Lorsch & Khurana, 1999), but the complexity will be further exacerbated when prior 
leader tenure is longer as boards have less experience of the hiring process, and so are less able 
to master the task and hence more susceptible to making suboptimal appointments. 
Accordingly, boards should not become complacent when there has been 
leadership/organizational stability. Rather, boards need to re-double their efforts to understand 
their organization’s environments and what they want from a (potential) new leader (see: 
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Lafley & Tichy, 2011). Third, our finding about internal/external appointments is a reminder 
that appointing from within is not always an optimal choice (Charan, 2005). Any hiring decision 
needs to take into account a range of factors, including the hiring practices of the industry and 
the (subsequent) level of information about inside/outside candidates (Charan, 2005; Khurana, 
2001). Overall, our research support calls for succession planning to be a regular agenda item at 
board meetings (e.g., Favaro et al., 2015; Miles & Larker, 2010; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2010). 
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TABLE 1 
Variables, Measures, and Data Sources 
Variable name Measures Data Sources 
 
Concurrent 
performance 
Measured as the league position after the focal 
game with values being reversed (e.g., the 
highest league position of one will be 20, two 
will be19 and so on 
Rothman’s/Sky Sport’s annual 
yearbooks (soccer yearbooks) 
and www.premierleague.com 
Concurrent prior 
performance 
Measured as a moving average of the total 
points attained in the prior three games 
Rothman’s/Sky Sport’s annual 
yearbooks (soccer yearbooks) 
and www.premierleague.com 
Promoted 
organization 
A binary variable, coded one if the leader’s 
organization was promoted from the 
Championship league to the EPL 
Rothman’s/Sky Sport’s annual 
yearbooks and 
www.premierleague.com 
Within-season 
succession 
A binary variable, coded one if the leader was 
appointed during a competitive season 
www.leaguemanagers.com 
Foreign ownership A binary variable, coded one the leader’s 
organization is owned if the leader was 
appointed within a competitive season 
LexisNexis 
Annual wage bill Measured as the annual wage bill of the leader’s 
organization, which was corrected to account 
for inflation effects 
Financial Analysis Made Easy 
(FAME) and Companies House 
Leader was prior a 
player 
A binary variable, coded one if the leader had a 
playing career at the focal organization 
www.soccerbase.com and 
LexisNexis 
Prior interim-leader 
tenure 
Measured as the total number of games an 
interim-leader was in place before the 
subsequent (permanent) appointment 
www.soccerbase.com and 
LexisNexis 
Split-leadership 
structure 
A binary variable, coded one if a director of 
football was in place at an organization 
LexisNexis and Companies 
House 
Returning leader A binary variable, coded one if the leader had 
led the organization in the past 
www.leaguemanagers.com 
Prior leadership 
experience 
Measured as the total number of seasons a 
leader has been a leader at other organizations 
prior to the focal appointment 
www.leaguemanagers.com 
Leader reputation Measured as the total number of competitions a 
leader has won 
www.leaguemanagers.com 
and LexisNexis 
Strategic changes Measured as the number of acquisitions divided 
by the number of games in a season 
www.soccerbase.com and 
LexisNexis 
First season dummy A binary variable, coded one in a leader’s second 
season (i.e., the season after appointment) 
www.leaguemanagers.com 
Leader-initiated A binary variable, coded one if the predecessor LexisNexis 
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predecessor exit leader exited for non-dismissal reasons 
Predecessor leader 
tenure  
Measured as the total number of games the 
predecessor led the organization  
www.leaguemanagers.com 
and Rothman’s/Sky Sport’s 
annual yearbooks 
Outside succession A binary variable, coded one if the new leader 
was appointed from outside of the organization 
LexisNexis 
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TABLE 2 
Means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlations a,b 
 
Variable name # Mean S.D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Concurrent performance 1 9.78 5.50                 
Concurrent prior performance 2 1.32 0.76 .52*                
Promoted organization 3 0.13 0.33 -.20* -.13*               
Within-season succession 4 0.56 0.50 -.16* -.05* -.03*              
Foreign ownership 5 0.17 0.38 .05* .03* .01* .03*             
Annual wage bill 6 0.94 0.53 .49* .32* -.23* -.07* .21*            
Leader was prior a player 7 0.22 0.42 -.01* .00 -.03* .19* -.13* -.05*           
Prior interim-leader tenure 8 1.45 5.14 .13* .05* -.02* -.05* -.01* .20* -.09*          
Split-leadership structure 9 0.17 0.38 .12* .07* -.03* .07* -.01* .18* -.01* .07*         
Returning leader 10 0.06 0.23 .03* .01 -.04* .12* .09* .01* .05* .12* .14*        
Prior leadership experience 11 9.14 7.60 -.02* .00 -.03* .08* .02* .02* -.33* .24* .01* .20*       
Leader reputation 12 1.46 2.94 .20* .11* -.14* -.08* .01* .30* -.21* .28* .10* .14* .24*      
Strategic changes 13 0.60 0.84 .00 -.01* .07* -.06* .02* .02* -.05* .03* .00 .00 .00 -.02*     
First season dummy 14 0.48 0.50 .17* .03* .15* .13* -.07* -.07* .16* -.08* -.05* .00 -.07* -.09* .13*    
Leader-initiated predecessor exit 15 0.23 0.42 -.09* -.09* .13* -.28* -.18* -.23* .14* -.15* -.04* -.09* -.28* -.20* .03* -.03*   
Predecessor leader tenure 16 94.96 103.36 .09* .05* -.06* -.02* -.11* .00 .02* -.09* -.13* -.11* .00 .01* -.03* -.10* .18*  
Outside succession 17 0.82 0.38 .00 .00 .11* -.15* -.04* -.01 -.36* .12* -.10* -.07* .31* .18* .03* -.01* -.19* -.01* 
Notes 
a N=6613—except concurrent prior performance (N=6122) 
b * p <0.05 
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TABLE 3 
Duration analyses predicting the hazard of dismissal of new leader dismissal a,b,c,d,e 
       
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Control Variables       
Concurrent performance -0.264*** -0.279*** -0.283*** -0.299*** -0.274*** -0.308*** 
 (0.043) (0.048) (0.040) (0.044) (0.045) (0.049) 
Concurrent prior performance -0.543** -0.553** -0.562** -0.563** -0.518** -0.538** 
 (0.187) (0.197) (0.182) (0.191) (0.199) (0.196) 
Promoted organization -0.826 -0.815† -0.800 -0.794 -0.480 -0.457 
 (0.536) (0.486) (0.543) (0.507) (0.506) (0.499) 
Within-season succession -0.630† -0.225 -0.551† -0.272 -0.721* -0.360 
 (0.352) (0.396) (0.306) (0.331) (0.362) (0.327) 
Foreign ownership -0.171 -0.095 -0.093 -0.074 -0.687 -0.619 
 (0.383) (0.378) (0.377) (0.377) (0.495) (0.489) 
Annual wage bill 1.872*** 2.255*** 2.038*** 2.370*** 2.066*** 2.539*** 
 (0.371) (0.417) (0.410) (0.443) (0.444) (0.505) 
Leader was prior a player -0.753 -0.889† -0.715 -0.874† -1.123* -1.261* 
 (0.524) (0.536) (0.488) (0.502) (0.543) (0.539) 
Prior interim-leader tenure 0.047* 0.055* 0.056* 0.063** 0.045† 0.062* 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) 
Split-leadership structure 0.671† 0.716* 0.867* 0.922** 0.666† 0.903* 
 (0.380) (0.356) (0.375) (0.352) (0.390) (0.351) 
Returning leader 1.023† 1.142* 1.472* 1.556** 1.100† 1.638** 
 (0.601) (0.568) (0.620) (0.594) (0.597) (0.613) 
Prior leadership experience -0.007 0.007 -0.011 0.001 0.013 0.017 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) 
Leader reputation -0.100† -0.095† -0.115† -0.115† -0.101† -0.124* 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.063) 
Strategic changes -0.437 -0.434 -0.409 -0.397 -0.279 -0.232 
 (0.317) (0.320) (0.326) (0.319) (0.307) (0.301) 
First season dummy 0.776 0.733 0.782 0.774 0.415 0.367 
 (0.525) (0.509) (0.501) (0.498) (0.565) (0.569) 
Model Variables       
Leader-initiated predecessor exit (H1)  1.224**  1.003*  0.875† 
  (0.408)  (0.427)  (0.470) 
Predecessor leader tenure (H2)   0.005*** 0.004***  0.004*** 
   (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Outside succession (H3)     -1.766*** -1.647*** 
     (0.435) (0.475) 
Number of observations 6122 6122 6122 6122 6122 6122 
Degrees of freedom 32 33 33 34 33 35 
Wald chi-square 142.177 158.985 179.095 179.631 175.524 218.896 
Log likelihood -244.246 -239.761 -236.946 -234.037 -234.899 -226.414 
AIC 552.491 545.521 539.892 536.074 535.798 522.828 
a Estimation of Cox proportional hazard model coefficients reported. 
b Robust standard errors (clustered by leader) reported in parentheses (one-tailed test for 
model variables; two-tailed test for controls). 
c N=6122 due to lagged concurrent prior performance variable. 
d Seasonal dummies included (but not reported) and statistically significant . 
e Levels of significance : † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
